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Abstract: The interest in the analysis of the iron ore market significantly increased after a sharp spike in the 
iron ore price in 2008-2010 and consecutive decline. Understanding of the reasons for these shifts are crucial 
for further development of the industry because a high price motivates investments in developing new mines 
but a long lead time for new projects and high price volatility make these investments very risky. The analysis 
of the studies of the iron ore market shows that the short-run behavior of iron ore price is highly dependent 
on oil price and variations in supply and demand, and is very difficult to predict. There are strong chances 
that the iron ore price will remain highly volatile with a low average in the long-run. The dependence on the 
price of oil and the corresponding volatility can be reduced by a gradual shift of iron ore sellers to non-fossil-
fuel transport. This shift can be facilitated by the public policy regulations, offered in Ali et al. (2017) if this 
approach dominates the “modestly optimistic perspective” offered in Tilton et al. (2018), which relies mostly 
on market forces in the intergenerational distribution of nonrenewable resources. If the latter approach 
dominates, it also allows for a more stable iron ore price, for example, in the case of cartelization of iron ore 
sellers. Using the arguments of Jones (1986), fortified by an incentive compatibility mechanism, the current 
situation in the iron ore market is quite favorable for coordinated actions of iron ore sellers. 
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"Contemplation of the world’s disappearing supplies of minerals, 
forests, and other exhaustible assets had led to demands for 
regulation of their exploitation. The feeling that these products are 
now too cheap for the good of future generations, that they are 
being selfishly exploited at too rapid a rate, and that in 
consequence of their excessive cheapness they are being 
produced and consumed wastefully has given rise to the 
conservation movement."         Harold Hotelling (1931) 
 
1. Introduction 
The interest in the analysis of the iron ore market significantly increased after a sharp spike 
in the iron ore price in 2008-2010 and consecutive decline; see Figure 1. Understanding of 
the reasons for these shifts are crucial for further development of the industry because a 
high price motivates investments in developing new mines but a long lead time for new 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
198
1
198
3
198
5
198
7
198
9
199
1
199
3
199
5
199
7
199
9
200
1
200
3
200
5
200
7
200
9
201
1
201
3
201
5
201
7
Nominal Real (2010)
 
Figure 1. Iron ore prices, annual averages, cfr (cost and freight) spot, $US/dmtu (dry metric ton unit). 
Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data 
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projects and high price volatility make these investments very risky. On the other hand, a 
low resource price may lead to underinvestment into new mines and wasteful resource use 
in the presence, which, as noted in the quotation of Hotelling (1931) above, harms future 
generations. This paper reviews the studies that assess various factors affecting the iron 
ore price and its volatility as well as the approaches to price forecasting.   
2. Long-term forecasts 
Pustov et al. (2013) provide cost-based forecasts for real price of iron ore (CFR China) 
until 2022 using three different approaches usually used by commodity analysts from 
investment banks, e.g. Barclays (Berry and Cooper 2011), Merrill Lynch, Citi, Itau BBA, 
J.P. Morgan (Bussitil 2011, De Angele 2011), and analytical agencies, e.g. CRU (Brooks 
2011). The forecasted price in all approaches ranges from $85/t to $125/t and rises to 
$150-220/t by 2022. The consensus average forecast of Citi, Macquarie, J.P. Morgan, 
UBS, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse, which is $88/t (FOB Brazil) also fells in 
this range after adding transportation costs. 
However, as it seen from Figure 1, the price dropped after 2013 and oscillates now around 
$60/t meaning that multimillion-dollar investments in new mines, based on $85/t – $125/t 
forecasts, may turn into irreversible losses. Why did it happen and how to avoid similar 
situations? 
2.1. Why it happened 
Figure 1 may lead to an intuitive prior conclusion that the high volatility and high values of 
iron ore price were caused by switching pricing regime from yearly negotiated to market 
pricing in 2008, see, e.g., Wu et al. (2016). Another factor suggested in Wu et al. (2016) is 
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the iron ore inventories at Chinese ports. When inventories are high, the price starts to 
decline and vise versa.  However, Wårell (2014, 2018) shows that the dependencies of 
iron ore price and its volatility on switching the regime are insignificant if an econometric 
model includes transportation costs and GDP growth in China. That is, the increases in 
freight rates and its volatility were the important reasons for the sharp changes in the iron 
ore price. 
2.2. Digging deeper 
Why do freight rates increased in that period? The answer is illustrated by Figure 2, which 
indicates unusually sharp spike in oil price in 2008. Moreover, another determinant of the 
iron ore price, GDP growth in China, may be also indirectly linked to oil shocks when these 
shocks contribute to economic recessions and slumps of demand for Chinese products, 
see, e.g., Hamilton (2009) and Kilian (2009). 
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Figure 2. Crude oil prices, annual averages, US$/bbl. Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data 
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2.3. What was the nature of the 2008 oil price shock and is it possible to predict such 
price movements? 
The shock resulted from inability of OPEC to match unprecedented surge in demand in 
emerging economies (Hamilton, 2009) and “the first significant decrease in non-OPEC 
supply since 1973 (Smith, 2009). No noticeable organised actions of speculators or price 
fixing were reported in this period. The timeline of the contributing events was as follows: 
February 2008: Venezuela cut off oil sales to Exxon Mobil during a legal battle over nationalization; 
March: saboteurs blew up the two main oil export pipelines in the south of Iraq; 
April 25: Nigerian union workers went out on strike, causing Exxon Mobil to shut in production; 
April 27: Scottish oil workers walked off the job, leading to closure of the North Forties pipeline that carries 
about half of the United Kingdom’s North Sea oil production; 
April: Mexican oil exports had fallen sharply due to rapid decline in Cantarell oil field; 
May: about 1.36 million barrels per day of Nigerian production was shut in due to a combination of militant 
attacks on oil facilities, sabotage, and labor strife; 
June, Nigeria: militant attacks caused Shell to shut in an additional 225,000 barrels per day; protesters blew 
up a pipeline that forced Chevron to shut in 125,000 barrels per day. 
All these events were registered in the spot market and hardly possible to predict. The 
cause of the sharp decline in oil price by 2009 was, indeed, the global economic recession. 
If the short-run spikes in the commodity prices are unpredictable, then maybe it is possible 
to estimate a long-run trend? After all, this information can be more important for long-term 
projects than the attempts to forecast the oscillations around the trend. 
6 
 
3. Nonrenewable resource prices and the Rule of Hotelling 
Hotelling (1931) introduced the rule that the price p of a nonrenewable natural resource (in 
situ, i.e., unextracted) must grow at the rate of interest r (dp/dt = pꞏr)2. Hotelling derived this 
rule as an equilibrium condition on the asset markets under some simplifying assumptions. 
This rule emerges also as a necessary condition of dynamic efficiency in a simple resource 
economy, see, e.g., Dasgupta and Heal (1979). 
3.1. The empirics of the Hotelling Rule 
A number of empirical studies, e.g., Krautkraemer (1998), Gaudet (2007), Hart and Spiro 
(2011), Radetzki and Wårell (2017) show that the real prices of nonrenewable resources 
such as fossil fuels and metals including iron, in fact, do not follow a growing trend but 
rather oscillate around some constants. The explanation is that the price, besides the 
“scarcity” part or Hotelling rent, contains various costs of bringing the resource to the 
market and depends on other factors such as market structure (the resource markets 
usually are not perfectly competitive), product durability (metals serve longer than fuels, 
which flattens the price path), technical progress and uncertainties in the future.3 
Moreover, real economies are not dynamically efficient, which makes the formula for the 
price path essentially more complicated than in the basic Hotelling rule, see, e.g., 
Bazhanov (2015). 
                                                            
2 For the extracted resource, the Hotelling rule requires that the resource rent, which is the price less the cost of 
extraction, grows at the rate of interest. 
3 In a comprehensive review of studies empirically testing the Hotelling rule, Livernois (2009) concludes that “the 
empirical evidence to date has not provided overwhelming support for the Hotelling Rule.” 
7 
 
3.2. Can this info help to predict the price trend? 
A standard econometric approach to forecasting is to assume that the past patterns will not 
change dramatically in the nearest future. Then, the empirical results above imply a simple 
rule of thumb that the nominal price of a specific ore should grow with a rate of inflation. 
However, even this simple rule is not free from some difficulties. First, there is a lack of 
consistent data for estimation of the average real price. The data for Fe 62% CFR in $US/t 
is available from 1981 to present, e.g., in the World Bank as annual averages yielding the 
average real price (2010) for this period around $61. Potter and Christy (1962) and Manthy 
(1978) provide the prices for pig iron from 1870 to 1973 measured in 1951-53 index. 
Krautkraemer (1998) considers the Pittsburgh real price of iron in ¢/lb. Despite these 
discrepancies, the comparison of studies of Slade (1982) and Krautkraemer (1998) testify 
that the prices before 1980 were higher than in 1980s. Slade (1982) conjectured that the 
prices of nonrenewable resources follow a U-shape trend but later studies did not confirm 
this conjecture because the prices dropped in 1980s. 
Assume that the average real (2010) price in 1870–2017 was $65US/t. The real price 
crosses this average approximately in 2004Q3 (2004.75) and around 2015 (Figure 1). 
Then a forecast for nominal price starting from 2005 is p(t) = p(2004.75)ꞏexp[rꞏ(t – 
2004.75)], where t > 2004.75 is the year for the forecasted price; p(t) is the forecasted 
nominal price in year t; p(2004.75) is the nominal price in 2004Q3 (around 60); and r is the 
rate of inflation. Assuming rmin = 0.005 (0.5% - no commodity booms scenario) and rmax = 
0.05 (5% - possible commodity booms scenario) we obtain the forecasts of the average 
nominal price in Figure 3. 
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The minimal and maximal forecasts are between the “consensus” and World Bank 
forecasts. The World Bank nominal and real price indexes for base metals, which are used 
to calculate real price for iron ore, follow decreasing trends starting from 2011 (deflation). If 
we assume that these trends will continue until 2019-2020 and then apply a constant-real-
price forecast with 1% inflation, we will obtain a forcast that is very close to that of the 
World Bank. 
3.3 Possible failures of low-price forecasts 
Since iron ore is a nonrenewable resource, the scarcity rent may cease to be masked by 
other factors such as declining (due to technological progress) costs of delivery to the 
market. Then the average real price will grow exponentially with the rate close to the 
interest rate and the scenarios predicted by Pustov et al. (2013) may be realized. However, 
as Pustov et al. (2013) admit, “currently proved iron ore reserves would suffice as many as 
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Figure 3. Iron ore nominal average price forecasts, CFR. 
Source: author’s estimates using constant-real price assumption; World Bank 
(http://databank.worldbank.org/data/) 
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40 years of consumption at today’s rates.” Therefore, low-price forecasts look plausible for 
the nearest 10-20 years. 
4. Possible actions of policy makers and resource sellers 
Low prices of nonrenewable resources are unfavourable not only for resource sellers. 
Hotelling (1931), whose quote heads this paper as well as Krautkraemer (1998), recalled 
that low prices lead to wasteful resource use, raising a need for regulations in favor of 
future generations. This concern is echoed in Ali et al. (2017) who conclude that “Global 
coordination is needed to ensure that minerals are produced in the most ecologically and 
economically efficient way.” Moreover, “international legal mechanisms may be needed to 
anticipate and respond to future mineral availability constraints.” A realization of this 
regulatory approach may lead to increases in the real prices of nonrenewables in the 
nearest future. 
As a response to Ali et al. (2017), Tilton et al. (2018) offer a “modestly optimistic 
perspective” for the problem of nonrenewable resource depletion. This approach relies 
mostly on market forces, but recognizes “that government intervention is needed to correct 
serious market failures” such as air and water pollution. The main argument is that the 
long-run persistent resource shortages should manifest themselves via growing trends of 
real costs and prices, which should provide incentives for development of substitute 
technologies. If this approach dominates public policies, the resource prices may continue 
to oscillate around relatively low averages for rather long period. 
It is known that free (unregulated) competitive resourse market may lead, besides 
wastefully low prices, to other failures such as tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968), 
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Dutch disease, and resource curse (Humphreys et al. 2007). Government bodies, as 
possible regulators, usually solve short-term problems linked to the goals for the next 
elections. Moreover, a unilateral regulation of resource extraction by one country cannot 
solve the global problem due to international competition. Therefore, the questions of 
international and intergenerational justice such as protection of ozone layer, climate 
change, or regulation of nonrenewable resource extraction can be solved only at the 
international level by agreements that set constraints on all parties. 
4.1. Resource price and market power 
The market-based approach does not necessarily imply low resource prices. The levels of 
average prices and price volatilities depend on a specific market structure. Ceteris paribus, 
it is easier for the sellers to set higher prices and reduce price volatility in a more 
concentrated market. That is, an increase in the market power of resource sellers can 
stabilize their profits, reduce the risks of investment in new mines and, at the same time, 
benefit future generations by increasing the time of resource extraction. 
Hotelling (1931) showed that a monopolist, by setting a high price, extracts a limited 
resource longer than under competition. Solow (1974) put it as follows: “The amusing thing 
is that if a conservationist is someone who would like to see resources conserved beyond 
the pace that competition would adopt, then the monopolist is the conservationist’s friend.” 
That is, an increase in the sellers’ market power can provide more resources to future 
generations. The following simple example illustrates this result. 
11 
 
4.2. Example 
Assume that there is a deposit of 10 units of a nonrenewable resource. The per-period 
demand for the resource is D = 10 – p, where p is the resource price. Normalizing cost to 
zero, the current profit is Πc = p(10 – p), where 10 – p is the resource supply. Perfect 
competition sets the optimal price to cost yielding zero profit, and the resource is extracted 
in one period. 
A myopic monopolist maximizes the current profit by setting the price p = 5 leading to 
extraction of the resource in two periods with the total (undiscounted) profit 50. A forward-
looking monopolist maximizes undiscounted total profit Π = Σi Πi, where Πi = pi(10 – pi) is 
the period i profit for i=1,…,T-1, and ΠT = pT(10 – ST-1) is the profit from selling the rest of 
the resource in the last period. Here T is the number of periods, pi is the price in period i, 
and ST-1 is the total supply in T-1 periods. In this case, the monopolist allocates the 
resource equally in T-1 periods by setting pi = 10(T-2)/(T-1) with the total profit 100(T-2)/(T-
1), which goes to 100 when T goes to infinity. That means that the monopolist would sell in 
each period infinitesimally small amount of the resource to the most efficient customer at 
the highest price. In practice, this price should yield the current profit that is just enough to 
cover the costs, and this price results already in a final time of extraction. 
4.3. Intertemporally fair price path 
In practice, businesses usually discount future profits, which, similarly to the example 
above, leads to a finite time of extraction. However, if a social planner discounts welfare of 
future generations in an economy that depends on a nonrenewable resource, the 
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consumption may eventually go to zero (extinction of the economy)4 (Dasgupta and Heal, 
1974). This happens because discounting reallocates the resource in favor of current 
generations. Therefore the resource price path that is determined by a current-profit 
maximizing monopolist can be considered only as a lower bound for an intertemporally fair 
price path. 
What is the upper bound for an intergenerationally just resource price? In the example 
above, the forward-looking monopolist sets the price equal to the highest customer 
valuation because the demand schedule does not depend on price. In fact, despite low 
short-run price elasticities of demand for nonrenewable resources (see, e.g., Zhang and 
Lawell, 2017), demand do declines when the shocks in commodity prices contribute to 
economic recessions,5 see Kilian (2009); and, as, e.g., Cashin et al. (1999) show, slumps 
in commodity prices usually last longer than booms. Therefore, a forward-looking 
monopolist with a low rate of intertemporal discount is not interested in a too high a price, 
which may be consistent with an intergenerationally just price that do not lead to 
recessions. 
However, an increase in market power is not enough to stabilize the price.6 As shown 
above, the dependence of freight rate on oil prices plays a crucial role in iron ore price 
volatility. A gradual shift to non-fossil-fuel transport can eventually solve this problem7. 
                                                            
4 As Ramsey (1928) put it, the discounting of the welfare of future generations “is ethically indefensible.” 
5 There are studies showing that recessions may result from the rate in resource price change rather than from its 
absolute value, i.e., only fast price jumps may lead to output decline, see, e.g., Bazhanov (2008), Corollary 1. 
6 Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) provide a general theory on commodity price stabilization. 
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These possible properties of a monopolist price, again, do not contradict the idea of 
intergenerational justice expressed in the notion of sustainable development, which, 
according to the Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987), is the “development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs.” 
4.4. Problems with increasing market power 
According to Jones (1986), “the chances of a cartel being successful are enhanced if:  
1) The number of producers is small. 
2) A sense of common purpose exists amongst producers (usually emanating from a 
mutual feeling of an external threat). 
3) Members are able to withstand temporary revenue shortfalls. 
4) A high proportion of total output is controlled by the cartel. 
5) The product has few substitutes. 
6) Supply outside the cartel cannot readily be increased.” 
After a detailed analysis of these factors, Jones concludes that “in many ways the iron ore 
industry is a prime candidate for cartelization.” The arguments leading to this conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
7 The examples of non‐fossil‐fuel passenger trains and ships are on the web site of World Steel Association 
(http://stories.worldsteel.org/innovation/hydrogen‐power‐trains‐future‐rail/ and 
http://stories.worldsteel.org/innovation/green‐future‐cruise‐liners/. Accessed 12 July 2018). The same approaches can 
be used for cargo carriers. The efficiency of electric heavy‐duty trucks is discussed in Sen et al. (2017). 
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are still valid, although, the rebuttals are also in force. One of the counterarguments is that 
“The interests of iron ore companies may not coincide with those of the host governments.” 
That is, a state-run cartel similar to OPEC has more chances for success. 
Another problem associated with an increase in market power is that monopolization 
usually entails legal actions. As Worstall (2016) put it, “if you try that sort of action inside 
the European Union you can be fined up to 10% of your global turnover for trying it on.” 
However, cartel OPEC, being a governmental organization, avoids these problems. In a 
detailed study, Desta (2010) concludes: “OPEC production restriction measures fall 
completely outside the scope of national competition law as well as WTO law.”8 
The main reason of cartels’ failures, as stressed by all authors starting from Jones (1986), 
is an incentive for cheating: “This fundamental instability stems from the ‘freerider 
problem’: producers as a group gain by restricting total supply, but each member of the 
cartel would profit even further by raising its own market share while others continued to 
restrict production. The basic conflict within a cartel is that it requires reduced production to 
operate while creating the incentive to increase it. If the problem cannot be resolved, the 
cartel will fall apart.” This is what happened with OPEC in 1986 when Saudi Arabia, tired of 
cheating of other OPEC members, who increased their market shares, decided to punish 
them and began producing at full capacity (Yergin, 1991). Similar failure followed an 
                                                            
8 Chimni (1987) provides a fundamental research on legal issues of international commodity agreements. 
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attempt of OPEC and some non-OPEC countries, such as Russia, to raise oil prices in 
2016 (Worstall, 2016).9 Is it possible to avoid the incentive for cheating in cartels? 
4.5. Incentive compatibility 
A possible mechanism for avoiding the cheating problem may involve financial 
commitments of all members of the agreement. For example, if an agreement is subject to 
annual renegotiation, all the members lock some assets in a reliable third-party financial 
institution for one year (security or warranty deposits), which is a regular practice for risky 
operations. The assets are proportional to the current market shares of the participants, 
and each asset equals a possible gain of the correspondent participant in the case of this 
participant’s cheating, assuming that other members keep to the agreement. Then, in the 
case of cheating, the financial institution reallocates the asset of the cheating member 
among other participants proportionally to their shares. Under such a commitment, every 
member knows that nobody has an incentive for cheating. A practical realization of such an 
agreement requires, of course, full transparency of the sales. As Levenstein and Suslow 
(2006) conclude in a comprehensive review of the history of cartel practices, “Successful 
cartels develop mechanisms for sharing information, making decisions, and manipulating 
incentives through self-imposed carrots and sticks.” 
                                                            
9  For  the  steel  industry, Malanichev  (2015)  claims  that  state‐run cartelization would benefit  the  industry  in  all  four 
scenarios  considered  in  the  paper.  The  scenarios  are  based  on  uncertainties  in  steel  capacity  utilization  and  raw 
material prices. This option, however,  is difficult to implement due to the same free rider problem that was pointed 
out by Jones (1986) as the main obstacle for cartelization of the iron ore industry. 
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5. Conclusions 
The short-run behavior of iron ore price is highly dependent on oil price and variations in 
supply and demand, and is very difficult to predict. There are strong chances that the iron 
ore price will remain highly volatile with a low average in the long-run. The dependence on 
the price of oil and the corresponding volatility can be reduced by a gradual shift of iron ore 
sellers to non-fossil-fuel transport. This shift can be facilitated by the public policy 
regulations, offered in Ali et al. (2017) if this approach dominates the “modestly optimistic 
perspective” offered in Tilton et al. (2018). The latter approach relies mostly on market 
forces in the intergenerational distribution of nonrenewable resources. If the latter 
approach dominates, it also allows for a more stable iron ore price, for example, in the 
case of cartelization of iron ore sellers. Using the arguments of Jones (1986), which can be 
fortified by an incentive compatibility mechanism, the current situation in the iron ore 
market is quite favorable for coordinated actions of iron ore sellers. 
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